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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
Actions brought under the nineteenth century Civil Rights Acts' or Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 dominated the field of constitutional
law considered by the Tenth Circuit last term. Of the major constitutional
law cases before the court, only two dealt with other issues.3 While none of
these cases were of monumental significance, the court did clarify several
previously cloudy areas of the statutes.
I. CASES UNDER THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 requires a showing that a
violation of a constitutional right occurred under color of state law. Other
sections of the acts 4 require a showing that the aggrieved party was a mem-
ber of a discriminated class. Questions arose last term as to who may be
sued, what immunities are available to defendants, what rights are afforded
constitutional protection, and what is state action. Two cases appealed to
the Tenth Circuit questioned the existence of a discriminated class under the
facts presented.5
A. Who May Be Sued and What Immunities Are Available?
During the last term of the United States Supreme Court, a landmark
decision was handed down. In Monell v. Department of Social Servi'ces,6 after
reviewing the legislative history of section 1983, 7 the Court held for the first
time that local governing bodies and local officials acting in their offficial
capacity are subject to suit under 1983.8 In doing so the Court in essence
overturned the earlier decision of Monroe v. Pape.9 However, in Monell the
Court specifically limited municipal liability to cases where "action pursuant
to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort."'"
Thus, a municipality may not be held liable under the theory of respondeat
superior merely because it employed a tortfeasor.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
3. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978) (commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(b)-(c), 1986 (1976).
5. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); Lessman v. McCor-
mick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. Id. at 664-89.
8. Id. at 690.
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
10. 436 U.S. at 691.
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1. Stoddard v. School District No. I I'
In Sboddard, the Tenth Circuit confronted a situation similar to Monell.
Annabell Stoddard, a nontenured elementary school teacher in Cokeville,
Wyoming, was denied renewal of her teaching contract. She filed an action
under section 1983 alleging that the nonrenewal was constitutionally imper-
missible. Named as defendants were the school district, its board of trustees,
the superintendent and principal in their official capacities, two members of
the board in their individual capacities, and the principal in his individual
capacity.
The plaintiff alleged that in a conversation with the principal the real
reasons given for her dismissal were (1) recurring rumors that she was having
an affair, (2) dissatisfaction in the community because she played cards and
did not attend church regularly, and (3) her unattractive physical appear-
ance. The principal had also stated that he had been informed by phone
that there would be "hell to pay" if the plaintiffs contract were renewed.
Evidence adduced at the trial indicated that a member of the board had told
the principal over the phone that he was "definitely opposed" to rehiring the
plaintiff.
The jury was given both general verdict and special interrogatory
forms. On the general form, the jury returned a verdict only against the
school district, the members of the board in their official capacities, and the
superintendent in his official capacity. The plaintiff was awarded compensa-
tory damages of $33,000; punitive damages of $5,000; and attorney's fees of
$5,800. In answering one of the special interrogatories, the jury found that
the individual defendants, two members of the board and the principal, had
acted in bad faith for reasons that were constitutionally impermissible in not
renewing the plaintiffs contract. The trial court, acting pursuant to rule
49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 entered judgment against
these defendants in their individual capacities notwithstanding the general
verdict in their favor.
On defendants' subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the trial court held that the school district was not a "person" under
section 1983 and vacated the judgment against it. In addition, the court set
aside the award of punitive damages and attorney's fees.
On cross-appeal, the plaintiff argued successfully that under Monell she
had a right to have the verdict against the school district reinstated. The
defendants argued that even under Monell the district remained immune
from liability because all it did was employ a tortfeasor-the school princi-
pal. The Tenth Circuit, rejecting the defendants' argument, found that the
district had been held liable for the actions of the board of directors in its
official capacity. The court found no problem with the doctrine of respondeat
superzor because the only way that the district could act was through its
11. 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. Rule 49(b) reads in part: "When the answers [to special interrogatories] are consistent
with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be




board.1 3 The court also rejected the defendants' alternative argument that
the board was an arm of the state and therefore immune under the eleventh
amendment. The court, citing M. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle
14
and Unifwd School Dzstrict No. 480 v. Epperson,' 5 found that a Wyoming school
district is more like a city or county than an arm of the state.' 6 Therefore,
the school district was not protected by the eleventh amendment.
2. Bertot v. School District No. 117
The United States Supreme Court decision in Monell specifically re-
served the question of whether municipal officials and governments have
some type of qualified "official" immunity.' 8 Almost immediately after the
Monell decision was handed down, the Tenth Circuit was faced with this
question in Bertot v. School District No. 1. '9
This was the second time that the Bertot case had come before the Tenth
Circuit on appeal. 20 On the first appeal, the court held that a teacher has a
cause of action under section 1983 without a showing of a property or liberty
interest if the teacher was dismissed for exercising her first amendment
rights.2 1 The case had been remanded to the district court for determination
of the immunities and defenses available to the school board in its official
capacity against liability for monetary damages, including basic pay.
22
In its second Bertot opinion the Tenth Circuit concluded that the dismis-
sal of the plaintiff was a "decision officially adopted" by the board.23 There-
fore, applying Monell, the court found that the school board and the school
district were proper defendants under section 1983.
Having so held, the court then addressed the issue of qualified immu-
nity for the school district and the individual defendants in their official ca-
pacities. It found that "[tihe reasons for the application of the doctrine of
qualified immunity are as compelling when considering the members indi-
vidually as they are to the evaluation of the members acting collectively
... .It is apparent that conscientious board members will be just as con-
cerned that their decisions or actions might create a liability for damages on
the board or local entity as they would on themselves."' 24 Thus, the Tenth
13. 590 F.2d at 835.
14. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
15. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978). The court in Epperson primarily relied on two tests to
determine if a school board were an arm of the state: "(1) To what extent does the board...
function with substantial autonomy from the state government and, (2) to what extent is the
agency financed independently of the state treasury." Id. at 1121-22.
16. 590 F.2d 829, 835 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978) (petition for rehearing granted). Reheard May
15, 1979. No decision had been handed down on the rehearing at the time this overview was
initially prepared. The decision on rehearing was.issued on Nov. 26, 1979. For a discussion of
the court's opinion on rehearing, see text accompanying notes 99-115 tnrna.
18. 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
19. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978) (petition for rehearing granted).
20. Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
21. Id. at 1179.
22. Id. at 1185.
23. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978).
24. Id. at 5.
1980]
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Circuit extended the same qualified immunity to local officials in their offi-
cial capacity as previously protected such officials in their individual capaci-
ties.
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the majority, relied on the California
Supreme Court decision in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District.25 The
Lopman court, however, disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's basic premise
that officials would be just as concerned about the liability of the govern-
mental agency as they are about their own personal liability. In the opinion
of the California court: "It is unlikely that officials would be as adversely
affected in the performance of their duties by the fear of liability on the part
of their employing agency as by the fear of personal liability. ' ' 26 Conse-
quently, the Lzpman court refused to find that the immunity of the school
district was coextensive with the immunity of its officials. Its rationale was
that the community as a whole "benefits from official action taken without
fear of personal liability, and it would be unjust in some circumstances to
require an individual injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of
his loss rather than to distribute it throughout the community. ' ' 27 In the
context of personnel cases, however, the court went on to say "[t]here is a
vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment of school
trustees . . . and trustees, being responsible for the fiscal well-being of their
districts, would be especially sensitive to the financial consequences of suits
for damages against the districts."'28 Thus, the California court concluded
that the good faith immunity did extend to the discretionary acts of school
boards within the scope of their official authority. Therefore, the school dis-
trict was not liable in tort for the alleged acts.
The Tenth Circuit further extended the Lipman decision to provide
qualified protection against liability for violations of constitutional rights.
Chief Judge Seth tried to distinguish a series of cases29 which, although not
thoroughly discussing the issue, held local governments liable for monetary
damages. To do so, he simply said: "Some courts have stated, but not neces-
sarily held, that qualified immunity should not be applied to a defendant
board. "30
In separate opinions, Judge Lewis and Judge Breitenstein differed with
the majority as to whether a court should assume the existence of no immu-
nity or a qualified immunity without legislative directives. Judge Lewis
found that the question of absolute immunity was of constitutional signifi-
cance-properly a judicial question-but that the extension of a qualified
immunity was a question for the legislature.3 ' Nevertheless, Judge Lewis
25. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (the California decision con-
cerned actions sounding in tort and breach of contract; no issue of constitutional rights was
involved).
26. Id. at 227, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
27. Id., 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
28. Id., 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
29. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. Col. Dist.
No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. Col., 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1975).
30. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 19.78).
31. Id., slip op. (Lewis, J., concurring).
[Vol. 57:2
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concurred with Chief Judge Seth in finding that the defendants should not
have been liable. His concurrence was based upon the jury's finding that the
defendants at all times acted in good faith.
32
Judge Breitenstein found that "no anomoly or inconsistency exists when
the same individuals who were found not liable in their individual capacities
are held liable for the same actions when sued in their official capacities."
'33
He recognized the need for spreading the economic cost of a violation over
the entire community. His primary concern was that providing qualified
immunity to officials in their official capacity would preclude any recovery
by a worthy plaintiff in many situations.
34
The majority opinion failed to recognize that the community benefits
from qualified immunity from personal liability for its officials. In doing so,
it failed to see the need for spreading the costs of this benefit throughout the
community and extended the doctrine of qualified immunity to municipal
employees in their official capacity. Thus, it eliminated the possibility of
monetary recovery by an aggrieved party for violation of his constitutional
rights when officials act in good faith.
B. What Rights are Constitutional4y Szgnitant?
Section 1983 requires that a constitutional right be violated by some
state action. In two cases before the Tenth Circuit last term the violation of
a constitutional right was the issue appealed.
1. Brenna v. Southern Colorado State College
35
A tenured professor sued his college after his contract was terminated
and a nontenured professor in the same department was retained. The
court, per Judge McKay, found that since Brenna was tenured he "had a
property interest deserving of the procedural and substantive protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
36
The court went on to find that there would have been no constitutional
violation if the procedure chosen for selecting terminations was reasonable
and if its results were not arbitrary or capricious. In Brenna, since budgetary
necessities had caused the layoffs and the decisions were based upon substan-
tive evidence, it was held that there had been no denial of a constitutional
right.
3 7
2. Lessman v. McCormick
38
In Lessman v. McCormick, the plaintiff was arrested at her Topeka, Kan-
sas, home by local police officers and taken to the station to pay an overdue
parking ticket. There she was detained until an official from the Topeka
32. Id.
33. Id., slip op. at 3 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting in part).
34. Id.
35. 589 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 476.
37. Id. at 477.
38. 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
1980]
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Bank and Trust Company came to talk to her about a loan she had with the
bank. Lessman contended that she had been arrested so that the bank could
intimidate her.
The trial court, in dismissing the action, held that since the arrest had
been technically lawful, the only unlawful detention occurred during the
time that it took the bank officer to arrive. The trial court then concluded
that this was an "insubstantial case" where the unlawful detention did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and therefore no cause of action
existed under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court decision on the grounds
that: "We do not consider the fact that the arrest was made upon a valid
warrant necessarily means that the time of false imprisonment begins only
after the fine was paid."'39 They found that this may be a "case of an arrest
not to collect on the overdue parking ticket, but to give improper aid to the
bank."'40 The Tenth Circuit then remanded the case to determine how
often, if ever, arrests are made to collect overdue fines.
C. What Constitutes State Action?
Section 1983 also requires that the violation of the constitutional right
be under color of state law. Two more cases in the Tenth Circuit clarified
this requirement.
1. Torres v. First State Bank
4 '
The plaintiff, an automobile dealer, had obtained financing through the
defendant bank. The plaintiff defaulted and the bank obtained a temporary
restraining order preventing him from "disposing of, conveying, or encum-
bering any property, real or personal, presently owned by him."'4 2 The de-
fendant demanded possession of the vehicles in which it had a security
interest, falsely claiming that right under the provisions of the temporary
restraining order. The plaintiff then brought this action on the grounds that
the temporary order deprived him of his right to due process by restraining
him from disposing of any property, not just the property in which the bank
had an interest.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of the action, held that
there was insufficient state action to bring suit under section 1983. The stat-
ute under which the order was granted was not attacked. The controversy
was between private litigants. One of the parties claimed he was injured by
the decision of the state court; however, the temporary restraining order was
immediately open to modification by the court upon application by the
plaintiff and subject to appeal. In affirming the dismissal of the action,
Judge Logan quoted from an earlier Tenth Circuit opinion:4 3 "'To hold
otherwise would open the door wide to every aggrieved litigant in a state
39. Id. at 610-11.
40. Id. at 611.
41. 588 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 1324.
43. Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948).
[Vol. 57:2
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court proceedings, and set up the federal courts as arbiter of the correctness
of every state court decision.' "44
2. T & W InVestment Co. V. Kurz
45
In T & W Investment Co., the Tenth Circuit was again faced with the
question of state action arising in the state courts, but it declined to address
the issue. A corporation brought suit against the court appointed receiver of
a wholly owned subsidiary for violating its due process rights. The Tenth
Circuit disposed of the case solely on the immunity question, sidestepping
the issue of state action. Citing Kermit Construction Corp. v. Banco Credito y
Ahorro Ponceno,4 6 the Tenth Circuit held that a receiver who carries out the
orders of the judge shares the judge's absolute immunity.
47
D. What Constitutes a Discriminated Class?
Sections 1981, 1985(b)-(c), and 1986 of the nineteenth century Civil
Rights Acts require that the aggrieved party be a member of a discriminated
class and that his rights be violated because of such membership. Two cases
before the Tenth Circuit last term help define what constitutes a discrimi-
nated class under these sections.
1. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 48
The plaintiff filed an action under section 1981 against his former em-
ployer and his union. He had been dismissed because of charges of theft of
Safeway property. After his acquittal on the theft charges, Safeway offered
to rehire him but without back pay. Manzanares alleged that he was a
member of a discriminated class-Mexican-Americans-and that Anglo em-
ployees of the company had confessed to stealing and nevertheless had been
retained.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dimiss on the grounds
that relief under section 1981 is available only for discrimination on the basis
of race or color and not on the basis of national origin.
Tenth Circuit Chief Judge Seth reversed and remanded the case for
trial. While section 1981 only says that "all persons" shall have the rights
and benefits of "white citizens," this language does not limit its protections
to the technical or restrictive definition of race. The court cited its own
opinion in Valdez v. Van Landngham:49
The issue is whether a Spanish surname constitutes a racial class
which is protected by section 1981. The term "race" in our lan-
guage has evolved to encompass some non-racial but ethnic groups.
This Circuit has recognized Spanish speaking or Spanish-surnamed
Americans as a minority for purposes of sections 1981, 1983, and
44. 588 F.2d at 1326 (quoting Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d at 707).
45. 588 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1978).
46. 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976).
47. M. at 3.
48. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979).




Thus the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its position that in certain situations na-
tional origin may be a sufficient class to give rise to protections under section
1981.
2. Lessman v. McCormtck
5 1
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that a bank, its employees, and the
police conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights in violation of
sections 1985(b)-(c) and 1986. To bring the action under these sections, Ms.
Lessman claimed to be a member of a discriminated class; ze., all debtors.
The Tenth Circuit, noting that such a class had never before been recog-
nized and that it would be the "largest class in America," rejected the plain-
tiffs claims under these sections and affirmed the dismissal by the district
court.
5 2
II. CASES UNDER TITLE VII
The Tenth Circuit struggled with cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Difficult questions arose on what constitutes a prima
facie showing of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas53 test, what
remedies are available under the Act, and how the 1972 amendments 54 are
to be applied.
A. What Constitutes a Prima Facie Case?
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,5 5 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced the procedure to be followed at trial for establishing a case under
Title VII:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of the complainant's qualifications . . . . The
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
56
50. 593 F.2d at 970.
51. 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 608. For a discussion of the issue of whether the police action invaded plaintiff's
constitutional rights, see text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
53. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The relevant
changes made by the amendments were the inclusion within the term "person" governments,
governmental agencies, and political subdivisions; the authorization of the EEOC to intervene
in civil actions brought under § 2000e-5 when the respondent is other than a government, gov-
ernmental agency, or political subdivision; the authorization to refer matters to the Attorney
General for such respondents; the extension of time periods for filing charges under the Act; and
the subjection of the federal government to Title VII.
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. Id. at 802.
[Vol. 57:2
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1. Diggs v. Western Electric Co. 57 and EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co. 58
Two cases before the Tenth Circuit last term concerned claims involv-
ing discriminatory hiring practices. In Dz'ggs v. Western Electric Co. ,59 it ap-
peared at first glance that the trial court did not follow the McDonnell
Douglas test. The plaintiff had applied to the defendant three times for em-
ployment and was rejected each time. Neither the trial court nor the Tenth
Circuit specifically found a prima facie case. The Tenth Circuit only found
that the evidence of discrimination was "sketchy." 6 The plaintiffs case es-
tablished that she was black, that Western Electric was hiring at the time of
her application, and that she was not hired. Her qualifications remained an
issue.
In defense Western Electric showed that since 1967 it had maintained
an affirmative action program which had been audited and approved by the
government on a regular basis. "The evidence also showed that there was no
pattern of employment discrimination by Western, and that actually its em-
ployment of members of minority groups exceeded the percentage of minor-
ity members in the Oklahoma City area work force."'6 1 Furthermore, the
employees of Western Electric who had interviewed the plaintiff testified
that she had no manufacturing experience and that she had wanted to start
work on the day shift while Western Electric's contract with the union re-
quired workers to start on the night shift.
After presentation of the employer's case, the Tenth Circuit found that
Western Electric had met its burden of articulating nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the plaintiffs rejection without first requiring the plaintiff to estab-
lish a prima facie case.
In EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 6 2 the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the
district court's finding of a prima facie case. A complaint was filed by the
EEOC on behalf of three Spanish-surnamed complainants claiming that re-
quiring a high school diploma (or a GED equivalent) and a passing grade on
an aptitude test prior to approval of these employment standards by the
EEOC constituted a violation of Title VII.
From May 1969 to July 1973, Navajo used a test administered by the
New Mexico Employment Security Commission to determine qualified ap-
plicants. In 1973 it was notified that the test was considered invalid by the
EEOC and consequently substituted another aptitude test. Since 1975, sta-
tistical adjustments had been made to equalize the raw scores of Spanish-
surnamed Americans and Anglos.
The trial court concluded that with the statistical adjustments there was
no discriminatory impact on minorities. Nevertheless, because the educa-
tional requirement and aptitude test had not received EEOC approval, the
57. 587 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1978).
58. 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979).
59. 587 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 1071.
61. Id. at 1071-72.
62. 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979).
19801
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trial court granted injunctions barring their use by Navajo and awarded
damages to the complainants.
The Tenth Circuit stated that a prima facie case is established "when it
is demonstrated that a defendant's employee selection practices, while per-
haps facially neutral and lacking in intent to discriminate, have a discrimi-
natory effect or disparate impact on minority hiring."63 In this case,
however, the employment requirements eliminated a greater number of
Spanish-surnamed Americans, but the actual percentage of such persons
hired was statistically favorable to Spanish-surnamed Americans.
The Tenth Circuit, in reversing the lower court, held that the questions
of disparity in educational requirements and the pass ratio on an aptitude
test do not arise until "there is discrimination in fact in actual numbers
hired."'64 Quoting from Hester v. Southern Railway,6 5 the court said:
"[N]onvalidated tests and subjective hiring procedures are not vio-
lative of Title VIIper se. Title VII comes into play only when such
practices result in discrimination . . . .The missing ingredient in
the proof here was the necessary showing of discrimination. With-
out such proof the district court lacked authority to enjoin the fur-
ther use of the testing and interviewing procedures . "..."66
If Navajo is to be followed, a new element seems to have been added to
the prima facie requirement-actual discrimination in numbers. However,
in another case the Tenth Circuit held that "It]he prima facie showing is not
the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination." 6 7 The distinction ap-
pears to be that actual discrimination must be found for an attack against
the general hiring practices of a company, while it need not be shown for an
isolated incident of alleged discrimination against an individual.
2. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp. I
The question of what constitutes a prima facie case again arose in the
James case, thistime in the context of alleged discrimination in promotions.
The plaintiff brought suit against her former employer alleging that she had
been passed over for promotion because of her sex. At trial, after the plain-
tiff's case, the judge denied the defendant's motion for dismissal. After the
presentation of the defense, the lower court concluded that the plaintiff had
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she had not been pro-
moted because of her sex.
In Rich v. Martin Marietta,69 the Tenth Circuit had set forth a procedure
for dealing with promotion cases similar to the McDonnell Douglas test:
"Once a plaintiff has shown that he is qualified, he need only show a dis-
criminatory impact and that he was among the class of employees who could
have been considered for promotion. Defendant may, of course, rebut this
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id. at 991.
65. 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. 593 F.2d at 991-92 (quoting 497 F.2d at 1381).
67. Silberhorn v. General Iron Works Co., 584 F.2d 970, 971 (10th Cir. 1978).
68. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
69. 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 57:2
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prima facie showing . . .70
Judge McWilliams, writing for the Tenth Circuit majority, believed
that the James case had met the guidelines of McDonnell Douglas and Rzch.
The denial of the defendant's motion for dismissal was in effect the trial
court's finding of a prima facie case. The defendant then rebutted this
prima facie showing. On this basis, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision.
Judge McKay, in his partially dissenting opinion, disagreed. He be-
lieved that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove her
case was a departure from the McDonnell Douglas approach. In support of his
position, he quoted from Bhzard o. Fielding:7 1 " 'It may be that the district
court will find, after three steps, what it found after one step.' . . . Nonethe-
less, I . . . 'do not feel free . . . to say that the McDonnell Douglas approach
can be dispensed with.' "72
It would appear, however, as the majority found, that the general pro-
cedures of McDonnell Douglas had been met and that a remand for retrial
along its precise wording would not have proven useful.
B. What Remedies are Available?
Another area with which the Tenth Circuit struggled was the remedies
available to an aggrieved party under Title VII. Particularly troublesome
were the questions of back pay and attorney's fees.
1. Comacho v. Colorado Electronic Technical College, Inc. 73
In Comacho, the plaintiff brought a successful Title VII action against
her former employer. The trial court awarded the plaintiff back pay for 56
1/2 months reduced by the amount she had earned during that period. The
defendant appealed on the grounds that two years prior to the date of the
judgment it had offered to reinstate the plaintiff without back pay. It ar-
gued that any award of back pay should have been cut off as of that date.
In a per curiam opinion, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's
award of damages. "Congress clearly intended that the remedies employed
would 'make whole' as nearly as possible any person injured under the
Act. . . . An offer of reinstatement without back pay does not 'make whole'
the person injured by an illegal firing."
'74
2. Carreathers o. Alexander
75
In a case similar to Comacho, the Tenth Circuit considered the retroac-
tive application of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In 1962, Carreathers
was employed at the GS-2 level after working for the Internal Revenue Serv-
70. Id. at 348.
71. 572 F.2d 13, 15 (lst Cir. 1978).
72. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 584 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. 590 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 889.
75. 587 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1978).
1980]
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ice for thirty years. In 1963, after filing a complaint based on his lack of
promotion, he was promoted to GS-3. He was promoted to GS-4 in 1968,
where he remained until this complaint was filed in 1972. The EEOC found
that Carreathers had been discriminated against, and the Internal Revenue
Service admitted the discrimination. Consequently, the IRS promoted him
to the GS-5 level retroactive to 1971.
After the agency's action was reviewed and approved by the Civil Serv-
ice Commission, the plaintiff sought further relief. No additional adminis-
trative relief was granted, and the plaintiff filed suit in district court. The
trial court ordered the IRS to provide job training for the plaintiff and
awarded the plaintiff $4,673.60 in back pay plus attorneys' fees and costs.
No back pay was awarded for any period prior to the effective date of the
1972 amendments to Title VII.
On appeal the plaintiff sought three things: (1) a trial de novo before
the district court; 76 (2) a retroactive application of the 1972 amendments in
order to recover back pay for the period prior to their enactment; and (3) a
finding that the award of attorneys' fees was unreasonable.
77
Prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court 78 and the Tenth
circuit 79 had held that the 1972 amendments may have a retroactive appli-
cation if the complaint was pending administratively or judicially on their
effective date. This filing requirement was designed to safeguard against
contrived claims. In Huntley v. Department of Health, Educatzon & Welfare,80 the
Fifth Circuit held, however, that the Act was applicable to violations prior to
the amendments without the necessity of a prior filing. Therefore, it be-
lieved that the amendments were more the recognition of a remedy rather
than the creation of a new right.
The Tenth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Huntley decision. 8 '
Judge Doyle, writing for the majority, saw Carreathers as a unique case strong
on equities. As a result of the statute of limitations in the Act,8 2 retroactive
application of the amendments in Carreathers would be effective for less than
two years. The discrimination admitted by the IRS occurred over a much
longer period of time. Furthermore, the plaintiff had not slept on his rights
but had filed complaints twice prior to 1972.
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit was reluctant to open the door to all past
employment practices of government agencies, it recognized that in this
unique case the plaintiff was especially worthy. The remedy which the trial
court had awarded the plaintiff had not made him "whole" as Title VII
76. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, since the IRS had already admitted the discrimina-
tion, no useful purpose would be served by having a trial de novo on the facts in the district
court. However, a trial de novo might be available if the district court found that plaintiff had
a sufficient basis for his claim of harassment. Id. at 1050.
77. The Tenth Circuit concluded that an award of attorneys' fees amounting to $35 per
hour for an experienced lawyer and $30 per hour for a less experienced lawyer was not unrea-
sonably low. Id. at 1052.
78. Place v. Weinberger, 426 U.S. 932 (1976).
79. Weakhee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
80. 550 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977).
81. Carreathers v. Alexander, 587 F.2d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1978).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
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intended. The Tenth Circuit recognized that it could not make the plaintiff
whole either, but awarded him what it could under a liberal interpretation
of the Act. The court retroactively applied the 1972 amendments for the
maximum allowable period, somewhat less than two years. The plaintiff
thus received additional back pay for those years which had previously been
denied by the trial court.
C. Requirements Under the 1972 Amendments: EEOC v. Zia Co.
8 3
Another perplexing problem arose out of the 1972 amendments in
EEOC v. Za Co.84 The amendments allowed the EEOC for the first time to
file suit in district court for a violation of Title VII. The Act has a prerequi-
site to filing suit: "[T]he Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."
85
The primary defendant, the Zia Company, was under contract to the
Atomic Energy Commission. Consequently, conciliation between the EEOC
and Zia required the approval of the AEC. The EEOC sent Zia a proposed
conciliation agreement containing the following "boilerplate" clause:
"The Commission shall determine whether the Respondent has
complied with the terms of this agreement. In the event the Com-
mission shall determine that the Respondent has failed or refused
to comply with the terms of this Agreement, the Commission shall
• . . notify the Respondent . . . . If within thirty days . . . the
Respondent has failed to comply with the terms of this Agreement,
or show good cause why he should not comply, all waivers, releases
and cdvenants not to sue shall be null and void, and such failure or
refusal to comply shall be deemed primafacie evidence of breach of
this Agreement."
'86
After negotiations this paragraph was modified to eliminate the conclu-
siveness of the Commission's findings upon a trial court. Zia then agreed to
the conciliation and forwarded the agreement to the AEC for approval. The
AEC refused to approve this agreement and negotiations then began directly
between the EEOC and the AEC at the regional level. After these proved
fruitless, counsel for the EEOC sent failure of conciliation notices to all par-
ties and forwarded the case to its litigation department.
Negotiations were then initiated at the Washington level between the
EEOC and the AEC. In January 1974, the general counsel for the AEC
recommended approval of the conciliation agreement. Subsequently, the of-
ficials at Zia attempted to reopen conciliation talks. They were advised by
the EEOC that the case was no longer in the conciliation stage and that a
complaint had been filed in district court. The EEOC's complaint prayed
for many claims which were never a part of the conciliation discussions, such
as back pay for all improperly laid off employees from 1965 to the date of the
83. 583 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
84. Id.
85. "42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
86. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1978).
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complaint. EEOC's trial counsel informed Zia that these new claims would
have to be resolved before an out of court settlement could be made.
In the district court, the judge found:
"that at the time referral of the case was made to the Denver Liti-
gation Center the local EEOC official knew or should have known
that the AEC and the EEOC were negotiating a conciliation agree-
ment at the Washington level; and that the regional EEOC officials
improperly refused to continue to conciliate in good faith."
He found "the essential condition precedent of the exhaustion
of efforts to conciliate has not been accomplished . .. I do not
think I have any jurisdiction at all to grant any relief in this case
because of the total failure to comply with the statutory man-
date."
8 7
However, the trial judge did address the merits of the case and found that
the plaintiff had failed to prove any discrimination by the defendants.
On the question of the district court's jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit
held that "the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the cause of action.
The inquiry into the duty of 'good faith' on the part of the EEOC is relevant
to whether the court should entertain the claim, or stay the proceedings for
further conciliation effort, not to its power over the cause."88 The case was
remanded for further conciliation negotiations subject to suit in the district
court if the negotiations failed.
III. OTHER CASES
A. Coleman v. Darden
8 9
In another employment related case, a plaintiff brought suit under the
Rehabilitation Act of 197390 and the fifth amendment. The defendants
were various officials of the EEOC. Coleman, although completely blind,
received an undergraduate degree from Louisiana State University and a
law degree from the University of Denver. During law school, he was em-
ployed by the EEOC as a part-time case analyst for one year and then pro-
moted to law clerk. He understood that if he did not gain admission to the
bar within fourteen months of this promotion, he would be terminated. He
was not admitted to the bar during the requisite period; consequently, he
was terminated.
Coleman did not question this termination, but rather the rejection of
his application for the position of research analyst. He contended that he
was denied his constitutional right to due process under the fifth amendment
because the defendants created an irrebuttable presumption that he could
not perform the job of research analyst because of his blindness. He further
alleged that his rejection was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all
of the plaintiff's claims.
87. Id. at 532.
88. Id. at 533.
89. 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
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1. The Fifth Amendment Claim
The Tenth Circuit held that the conclusive presumption doctrine was
inapplicable to an employment situation such as this. Whenever an appli-
cant is rejected from a job, there is a presumption that someone else could
have performed the job more successfully. Such presumptions are "a fact of
business life" and do not mean "that 'trial periods' should be required for all,
or even all handicapped applicants . . .91
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Coleman's due process claim
on the ground that he did not have a sufficient property or liberty interest in
obtaining the desired employment. 9 2 Since Coleman could not show a legal
entitlement to the position, his due process rights had not been violated.
2. The Statutory Claims
The Tenth Circuit likewise found grounds to reject each of Coleman's
statutory claims. The Tenth Circuit joined the four other circuits which
have decided the issue when it held that a private cause of action may be
implied from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9 3 However, it held that under
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, federal agencies are not
proper defendants. Thus, Coleman's suit against the EEOC was not action-
able.
Coleman had further contended that the Administrative Procedure
Act 94 gave him a right to judicial review of the agency's action. The Tenth
Circuit again agreed with him but found that the applicable standard of
review allowed reversal only if the action was arbitrary or capricious. "The
Court's function is exhausted where a rational basis is found for the agency
action taken." 95 Coleman had worked for the EEOC for over two years, and
the agency was aware of his abilities. This fact showed the court that the
EEOC was not adverse to hiring visually handicapped persons and that the
defendants had rational grounds for not rehiring Coleman. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal on all counts.
B. Hardage v. Atkins
96
Hardage v. Atkins was the only purely constitutional case to come before
the Tenth Circuit last term. Title 63, section 2764 of the Oklahoma statutes
banned the shipment of solid waste into Oklahoma from any other state
unless the other state had entered into a reciprocal agreement with
91. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 538.
93. Davis v. Southeastern Community Col., 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cer. granted, 99
S. Ct. 830 (1979); United Handicapped Fed. v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
95. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 539 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting from Sabin v. Butz,
515 F.2d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 1975)).
96. 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
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Oklahoma.9 7 Hardage owned and operated a disposal facility in Oklahoma
and sought customers from Texas which had not entered into the necessary
reciprocal agreement.
The trial court held that solid waste material was not commerce and
therefore not subject to the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. The trial court, however, went on to say that if solid waste were com-
merce, the Oklahoma statute would be unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision had decided the status of solid waste material. In
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 the Court held that solid waste material was
commerce and that a ban on its shipment into a state was a violation of the
commerce clause. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court
and held the Oklahoma statute invalid.
IV. GOOD FAITH IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL ENTITIES RECONSIDERED
The Tenth Circuit has reversed en banc the decision of the three-judge
panel in Bertot v. School Dzstrct No. 1,99 which has been previously discussed
in depth in this overview. 100 At the time of the rehearing, Chief Judge Seth
was the only judge from the original panel remaining on the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The only issue before the court on rehearing was the scope of the immu-
nity of school officials and the commensurate liability of the school dis-
trict.' 0 1 Other issues decided by the three-judge panel were not raised on
rehearing. 102
The majority opinion on rehearing, written by Judge McKay, empha-
sized three points, each of which was attacked in the dissenting opinions of
Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett. First, the majority found that common
law immunities are applicable to section 1983 actions against local gov-
erning bodies. '0 3 Next the court characterized back pay as an element of
equitable relief rather than compensatory damages.' 0 4 Finally, Judge Mc-
Kay emphasized that the infringement of the plaintiff's first amendment
rights "provide[d] further justification for insuring that full relief is available
to the appellant and that the unconstitutional behavior of the appellees, no
matter how well intentioned, is deterred."'
0 5
97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West Supp. 1978) reads in part:
The Division shall disapprove any plan which entails the shipping of controlled indus-
trial waste into the State of Oklahoma, unless the state of origin of such waste has
enacted substantially similar standards for controlled industrial waste disposal as, and
has entered into a reciprocity agreement with, the State of Oklahoma.
98. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
99. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979).
100. See text accompanying notes 17-34 supra.
101. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 2 n.1, 4 n.3.
102. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.3 in which the court en banc disposed of the eleventh amendment
issue by noting its agreement with the three-judge panel.
103. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 4-8.
104. Id. at 9-10.
105. Id. at 13.
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The rationale of the majority was that at common law the good faith
immunity only protected officials in their individual capacities from personal
liability. Public entities were not granted the same common law immunity
although some entities were protected by the eleventh amendment.' 0 6 The
court refused to write into section 1983 any immunity not recognized at
common law. Since common law allowed recovery of monetary damages
from public entities in appropriate cases, the court held that Congress did
not intend "good faith individual immunity to preclude recovery alto-
gether."' 0 7 Thus, the immunity of the school district is not coextensive with
the immunity of the officials as individuals.
Chief Judge Seth disagreed with the majority's holding on the applica-
bility of common law immunities under section 1983. In doing so, he relied
on the rationale rather than the holding of lmbler v. Pachiman 108 for the prop-
osition that the question is not whether common law immunities apply in an
action against a municipality, but whether considerations of public policy
underlying those immunities "'countenance' immunity under section
1983." 109 Again specifically refusing to distinguish between officials in their
individual and official capacities,i i0 the Chief Judge concluded that public
policy required good faith immunity protection for the school board since
future board decisions could be influenced by the possibility of monetary
liability to the district.
In his separate dissent, Judge Barrett was concerned with the economic
danger to local governing bodies from the majority's holding that "equitable
relief is not precluded by a good faith defense.'ii Judge Barrett further
rejected the majority's distinction between back pay as equitable relief and
compensatory damages. i2 In his opinion, removal of the good faith defense
exposed local entities to dire financial liability for compensatory damages.
Both dissenting judges took issue with the majority's view that the first
amendment implications made the school board's action even more repre-
hensible and thus subject to absolute liability. For the dissenters, the fact
that constitutional rights were involved weighed in favor of a good faith
immunity for the board rather than vice-versa. Quoting from the Bertot II
opinion, Judge Barrett emphasized that " 'we cannot say that the defendants knew
or reasonably should have known that their actions would vitolate constitutional
rights.' '1 13 Since it is difficult to make a "rough predication about the scope
of constitutional rights" as the majority would require the school district to
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 7.
108. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Bertot MI1 majority opinion cited Imbler's holding as support
for incorporation of common law immunities into § 1983. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 4.
109. No. 76-1169, slip op. at I (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2. See also text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
Ill. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 9.
112. Id., slip op. at 4 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 2-3 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting 522 F.2d 1171, 114-85 (10th Cir. 1975))
(emphasis added by Judge Barrett).
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do,'1 t4 the dissenters argued that the school board or the district as such
should not be held liable for making an erroneous prediction.' 
15
Jeremiah B Barry
114. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 14.
115. Id., slip op. at 3 (Seth, C.J., dissenting); id., slip op. at 2-3 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Both
dissenting judges emphasized that the board had followed the Tenth Circuit's own prediction in
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970), where a
similar claim of failure to renew a nontenured teacher's contract on constitutionally impermissi-
ble grounds was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Bertot I1 majority, however, found that the board's reliance on Jones only went to the issue of
good faith which had been conceded by the parties on appeal. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 12-13.
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